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Abstract 
I analyze the sovereign debt restructuring practice of the Chinese Nanking 
Nationalist Government between 1928 and 1937 from the perspective of theories on 
sovereign debt. I find that the traditional reputational model, signaling model, and 
sanctions model cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of my case. Therefore, 
using the analytical framework of the informational model of Sandleris (2008), I offer 
my explanation on the historical findings I have collected. My result suggests that the 
need to establish the credibility of the government to ensure the continuing success of 
the currency reform may be the direct cause of the settlement. The initial success of 
the currency reform provides a favorable environment for the settlement. In turn, the 
settlement promotes the continuing success of the currency reform, thus creating a 
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Introduction 
A great number of economics studies have extensively elaborated on a key question 
on sovereign lending: Why are sovereign debtor countries willing to repay their debt? 
Unlike corporate borrowing, which is governed by bankruptcy laws, there is no 
corresponding legal enforcement mechanism on sovereign debt repayment. If cost of 
default is negligible, no rational debtor countries will repay, and no creditor countries 
will lend in anticipation of this result. There must be an enforcement mechanism to 
impose substantial cost on a defaulting sovereign to support sovereign lending and 
repayment in real life. The existing literature focuses mainly on two channels in 
enforcing sovereign debt repayment. The first line of reasoning is that sovereign 
debtors repay to preserve their reputation in the international capital market, granting 
them continued access to foreign credit in the future. The other line of reasoning 
states that sovereign creditors must be able to tie the debt repayment with explicit 
sanctions, such as military invasion or trade embargo, to enforce repayment. 
Reputation alone in the international credit market is not a sufficient condition for 
repayment. None of the two methods can give a satisfactory explanation on sovereign 
default, and disputes on this problem continue up to the present. Given the difficulty 
in finding a quantitative measure of the cost of sovereign default, standard 
econometric models are insufficient in testing conflicting theories on sovereign 
default. Case studies that consider the story in the general historical background have 
been popular in examining the empirical backgrounds of theoretical papers in the 
studied years. 
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Recently, Sandleris (2008) has proposed an innovative explanation on sovereign 
default and repayment based on the informational cost of default. According to 
Sandleris, the default decision will send a bad signal about the sovereign borrower to 
the public, incurring significant welfare loss for the sovereign borrower. Although this 
idea is interesting, its empirical exploration is difficult to design, given the 
implicitness of the informational cost. The debt restructuring practice in the Republic 
of China under the reign of the Nanking Nationalist Government in the Prewar Era 
(1928-1937) provides a good case for Sandleris' reasoning. When the Nanking 
government took control of the whole country in 1928, it inherited a huge amount of 
sovereign debt from the Late Qing Dynasty and the Beijing government, which had 
fallen into arrears for many years. Although the Nanking government recognized all 
debts inherited from the previous regime at the beginning, no material settlement was 
made until 1935. When the external shock of the American Act of Silver Purchase put 
China into deep deflation and recession, a switch from the silver standard to the paper 
money system was deemed necessary for China to recover. To boost historically the 
low confidence on the ability of the government to maintain a paper money system 
and gamer foreign support for the reform, the government found conducting a 
large-scale settlement of the old debts useful. The initial success of the currency 
reform also gave the Nationalist party enough confidence to settle the debts because 
they felt that China would be able to recover from the recession. These concerns 
might have motivated the Nanking government to settle about 50% of all its debt in 
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arrears in 20 months. If the war against Japan did not push through, the settlement 
would have been completed in a few months. Investors reacted positively to the 
settlement, and the Chinese sovereign bonds traded in London rose dramatically after 
the beginning of the large-scale settlement. The capital market access of China 
significantly improved, and the Nanking government was able to issue public bonds 
in London for the first time. Deflation was replaced with moderate inflation, and the 
exchange rate of China was fixed to hard currency during that time in Chinese history. 
Foreign capitals flowed into China, and industrial products soared after the reform of 
monetary and fiscal matters. These successes were closely related to the settlement of 
old debts as a signal of fiscal probity and positive outlook for the whole economy. 
The emphasis on post-default episode is an important characteristic of the current 
paper. The existing literature usually focuses on the default episode while ignoring the 
story of the settlement of old debts after default. The restructuring episode is similar 
to a mirror of the default episode, which can reflect some facts that may not be 
directly observed in the default episode. Owing to the difficulty in estimating the cost 
of sovereign default, I will examine the benefit of sovereign debt repayment instead. 
My story has a special historical significance. The prewar decade of China was a 
period between long-term internal conflict and the Second Sino-Japanese War. When 
the Nanking government took control of the entire China, the domestic situation was 
chaotic, and the fiscal status was in disorder. The Nanking government strived to 
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transform the country from its weak and disordered situation to a strong and united 
state. The achievement of the Nanking government in economic progress and political 
unity was admirable. Especially, it settled most of the sovereign debt in arrears and 
initiated a successful currency reform that abolished forever the silver standard in 
China. The great accomplishment of the Nanking government in the prewar decade 
might contribute significantly to the sustainability of China in its endless war against 
Japan. 
In my paper, history and economic theories are related in two aspects. On one hand, 
economic theory provides an analytical framework that can offer us a new perspective 
in understanding history. Some Chinese historians claimed that the settlement of 
foreign debts was harmful, given the meager fiscal status of China. My research finds 
that the settlement of foreign debts is necessary to ensure the continuing success of 
currency reform, which was a very important factor in sustaining the Chinese military 
forces in the eight-year war. On the other hand, historical facts provide an excellent 
natural experiment for us to explore the exploitability of conflicting sovereign debt 
theories in the real world. The most significant limitation of the informational 
explanation of sovereign default is the implicit cost of default. While cost of 
sovereign default from losing access to the capital market and suffering direct 
sanctions from creditors is relatively easy to estimate, the informational cost of 
sovereign default is difficult to measure in reality. In my case, the external shock of 
currency reform dramatically increases the informational cost of sovereign default, 
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whereas other factors influencing default choice are relatively certain at the same time. 
This natural experiment enables us to isolate the effect of informational cost from 
other costs of sovereign defaults and offers an explanation based on the current issue. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I gives a brief literature review 
on the theories about sovereign debt restructuring. Section II describes the fiscal 
status of China in the prewar decade. Section III describes the defaulting and 
restructuring episodes of China. Section IV discusses the access to international 
capital market of China in the prewar decade with the use of reputational theories. 
Section V discusses the applicability of the sanctions model in the present case. 
Section VI presents my explanation on the restructuring episode using the 
informational model. Section VII gives the conclusion of the current study. 
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Section I Literature Review 
Theories on Sovereign Default 
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) initially proposed the reputational model in 1981. This 
model emphasizes the importance of maintaining reputation in international lending. 
They consider international lending as a repeated game between creditors and 
borrowers. The main incentive for borrowers to repay is to retain their 
creditworthiness to maintain access to capital markets. If a sovereign borrower does 
not repay, the private agents will penalize the sovereign borrower by excluding them 
from any future borrowing indefinitely. Assuming that the exclusion from capital 
markets is permanent, lenders will establish a credit ceiling above which they will be 
unwilling to increase loans. Under this credit ceiling, the cost of exclusion from 
capital markets will be large enough to make sovereign borrowers repay their debt to 
maintain their reputation. 
However, Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) (1989b) criticize Eaton and Gersovitz's opinion. 
They claim that a simple reputational sanction does not enforce sovereign debt 
repayment. In a frictionless world where countries are able to save output at the world 
interest rate, sovereign borrowers are always better off if they choose saving rather 
than repaying. To sustain sovereign lending and repayment, creditors must be able to 
impose additional and costlier penalties beyond the cut-off of access to the 
international capital market in the model. Bulow and Rogoff further establish a model 
in which sovereign creditors are able to go to their courts to limit the ability of 
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defaulting sovereign to transact freely in foreign markets. This punishment could be 
costly enough to make the sovereign borrower finally repay. 
Based on these two fundamental concepts, scholars provide a number of insightful 
explanations on the sovereign debt issue. Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) present a 
model in which a government borrows to finance its investment. The government in 
the model signs a state-contingent contract with the lender. This contract specifies that 
in high states of nature, the government should repay an amount higher than the value 
of the borrowed funds times one plus the interest rate, whereas in bad states, the 
government payments are less than this amount. This last event is what they call 
partial default, which does not lead to any punishment. Only the full repudiation of 
payments entails permanent exclusion from capital markets. That is, lenders 
differentiate excusable defaults, which are associated with implicitly understood 
contingencies from unjustifiable repudiation. 
Cole, Dow, and English (1995) consider the lending resumption of a sovereign 
borrower after a default. They construct a model in which defaulting nations are 
excluded from capital markets and regain access by making partial repayments. 
Historical evidence (i.e., 1820s and 1870s in Latin America and 1840s in the U.S.) 
shows that defaulting countries return to the international loan market soon after a 
settlement but after varying degrees of exclusion. The settlement of old debt provides 
a "signal" that the borrower's time preferences have changed to be more forward 
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looking. When a government becomes more stable and thus less myopic, its time 
preferences will change. While a change in government is usually observable, 
changes in the collective preferences of the country, in the relative power of different 
interest groups, or in the internal politics of the government are more difficult to 
observe but they can still affect the country's willingness to repay its debts. In such 
circumstance, the partial or full settlement of old debt is an efficient signal to show 
that the credibility of the defaulting sovereign has improved. Receiving this signal, 
creditors will grant access to the sovereign borrower again. 
Cole and Kehoe (1998) admit that ordinary reputational model is indeed subject to the 
critique held by Bulow and Rogoff (1989a & 1989b). However, if a country is 
involved in a myriad of trust relationships, the country's reputation may spill over to a 
non-debt relationship, which is more important than the lending relationship. Thus, if 
a sovereign borrower defaults in its obligations to its creditors, it will also be 
considered untrustworthy in other trust relationships. They further discuss two 
possible channels of the reputational spillover. A sovereign default emits a signal that 
the government disregards the property and contract rights, threatening the operation 
of a market economy. Also in international affairs, other countries, especially the 
creditor countries, are unwilling to establish a diplomatic or military alliance with a 
defaulting sovereign that lacks fundamental creditworthiness. The cost of reputational 
spillover becomes large enough to enforce sovereign debt repayment. 
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Sandleris (2008) presents his explanation on sovereign debt repayment in a way 
different from both reputational and sanctions models. He considers the repayment or 
default decision as revealing information to domestic and foreign agents about the 
fundamentals of the sovereign borrower. The government repays to generate a signal 
to change the expectation of the public. The logic behind Sandleris's model is similar 
to that behind the general reputational model of Cole and Kehoe (1998). The 
difference is that the signal of repayment or default only affects the reputation in other 
trust relationships of the government in Cole, Dow, and English's model, whereas it 
also conveys information about the fundamental about the whole economy at the same 
time. The general reputational model can be viewed as a special case of Sandleris's 
"informational model." Sandleris further discusses a channel through which the 
sovereign default induces a shrink in foreign investment and a credit crunch in the 
domestic private sector, which is costly for the sovereign borrower. 
Sole (2009) proposed that lenders' responses to default stem from the additional 
knowledge about borrowers, which is acquired during default episodes. Lending is 
modeled in a costly-state-verification environment where sovereigns have private 
information about their investment projects (good or bad). When lenders consider that 
sovereign borrowers have been investing in infrastructure and other projects that will 
enhance their future growth, new loans are relatively easy to obtain. For countries that 
used the borrowed funds to sustain current consumption and repay older debts, further 
credit will be denied. After default, lenders audit projects and interrupt lending only if 
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the project is considered a "bad" one. Even in the event of sovereign default, if the 
borrowing government can signal the profitability of its project, it can still obtain new 
funds before repayment. 
Historical Case Studies on Sovereign Default 
William B. English (1996) studies the defaults and repudiations of the U.S. states in 
the 1840s. He finds that even when direct sanctions are proven inapplicable, most of 
the U.S. states choose to repay their debts at least partially. This finding supports that 
repayment can be realized without any direct sanction or threat of sanction. 
Maintaining access to capital markets proves to be the main driving mechanism for 
repayment by states. 
In a study conducted by Marc D. Weidenmeir (2004), he found out that direct 
sanctions can sustain debt repayment without any reputation. In the American Civil 
War, the rebelling Southern Confederacy, which is believed to have no reputation at 
all, managed to float a bond in London. The Southern Confederacy sustained its 
repaying of the bond until its decisive defeat because many important figures, such as 
gun suppliers, investment banks, shipbuilders, and British politicians, served as the 
holders of the bond. The suspension of debt service could bring large potential costs 
to the military operations of the Southern Confederacy. 
James Conklin (1998) studies Habsburg Spain's sovereign debt repayments during the 
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reign of Philip II from 1556 to 1598. Philip II tried to renege on his debt obligations, 
which caused his Genoese lenders to suspend the transfer of international payment of 
Spain as punishment. The penalty greatly interrupted the military operation of Spain 
in the Netherlands and finally forced the King to repay. Conklin finds that all four 
defaults of Spain caused the immediate punishment of the Genoese lenders and that 
the repayment was done quickly after the punishment. As such, direct sanctions 
served as the main driving motivation for the Spanish King to repay his debt. 
Feder and Just (1984) explore the Egyptian debt crisis. They examine the case of 
international lending to Egypt during the period of 1862-1876, which coincided with 
a boom-crash cycle in international lending. They construct a model to measure the 
perceived default probability of the sovereign bond of Egypt by investors. Based on 
their study, when investors anticipate diplomatic or military sanctions unlikely to 
occur, they are over-pessimistic on the recovery rate of the debt service payment in 
the case of the expected Egyptian default. This occurrence decreased the willingness 
of investors to buy Egyptian bonds and later increased the financing cost for the 
Egyptian government. 
Brief Summary on the Existing Theories and Empirical Cases 
A main issue in the sovereign default literature is the cost of default. The traditional 
classification of theoretical models is based on the source of the cost. Models that 
attribute the cost of sovereign default to the cutoff from the sovereign debt market are 
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called reputational models. Models that attribute the cost of sovereign default to 
punishment in non-debt areas are called sanctions models. This classification provides 
a basic framework for sovereign debt literature. Nevertheless, some additional 
improvements can still be conducted on these models. Consideration should be made 
on whether the cost is intentionally imposed by creditors or the cost serves as a signal 
of a bad situation. If the cost is a game intentionally imposed by creditors to enforce 
repayment, there may be a commitment problem in imposing punishment because the 
punishment may not be beneficial for them. Instead, if the cost is a natural result of 
bad track record, how important the information content of bad track record is the 
central issue of measuring the cost of sovereign default. To clarify the issue, I create a 
2*2 matrix and consider major theories and empirical literature in my investigation. 
Table I Classification of Literature on Sovereign Defaults 
Access to Capital Market Non-debt Arena 
Sanctions Model (Bulow and 
Rogoff 1989a&b), Spain in the 
Reputational Model (Eaton 
Punishment 16th Century (Conklin 1998), 
and Gersovitz 1981) 
Southern Confederate 
(Weidenmier 2004) 
Signaling Model (Cole, General Reputational Model 
Dow and Englishl995), (Cole and Kehoe 1998), 
Signaling 
American States in the Informational Model (Sandleris 
1840s (English 1996) 2008) 
The table includes some of the theoretical and empirical studies most important in the 
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current study. The traditional reputational model (Eaton and Gersovitz 1981) and 
sanctions model (Bulow and Rogoff 1989a & 1989b) are located on the top row of the 
matrix. The signaling model (Cole, Dow and Englishl995) is on the bottom row 
because there are some differences in the role of reputation in the traditional model 
and signaling model. In the traditional reputational model, reputation is interpreted as 
a punishment mechanism of old creditors in the repeated game between creditors and 
borrowers. In the signaling model, reputation is a measurement of the credibility of 
the sovereign borrower. Default will damage the reputation of a sovereign borrower 
because it is a signal of low creditworthiness. However, reputation is restorable 
through a partial settlement. Conversely, in the traditional reputational model, the cost 
of default is not restorable through a partial settlement. Once the repayment of a 
sovereign lender falls short of its total obligation, the borrower will not be allowed to 
borrow again as punishment. 
The informational model is on the lower right side of the matrix. Actually, Sandleris 
did not name his model formally; I call it informational model for convenience. 
Although Cole and Kehoe (1998) refer to their model as a general reputational model, 
I also put it on the lower right side of the matrix because it emphasizes the role of 
non-debt relationship in the sovereign debt enforcement. In the following paragraphs, 
I will discuss the general reputational model of Cole and Kehoe (1998) as a special 
case of informational model because of its similarity of thought with the informational 
model. 
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Paying attention to the difference of the informational model (including reputational 
model) from the sanctions model and signaling model is important. The sanctions 
model and informational model similarly emphasize the role of non-debt arena of 
sovereign default. The difference is that in the sanctions model, the cost of sovereign 
default is deliberately imposed by the old creditors as punishment, whereas in the 
informational model, the cost of default comes from the signal of a bad economic 
fundamental (including bad general reputation) of a sovereign borrower. The 
signaling model is similar to the informational model in that they both emphasize the 
role of the information content of default and repayment rather than the punishment 
mechanism. The difference between the two is that the signaling model stresses the 
role of access to the capital market in the cost of default, whereas the informational 
model gives more weight to its influence on the expectation of domestic and foreign 
agents on the economic fundamentals. 
In what follows, I will examine the explanatory power of the four models in the 
current case. First, I will study the access to the capital market with the traditional 
reputational model and the signaling model, which I call reputational models, in 
Section IV. I will study them together because they are similar in explaining the 
source of cost of sovereign default. In Section V，I will examine the possible direct 
sanctions available in the current case to test the validity of the sanctions model. 
Finally, I will present my own explanation of the sovereign debt restructuring episode 
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of the Nanking government based on the informational model. 
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Section II Historical Backgrounds 
Political Instability and Military Expenditures 
After Yuan Shikai's death, the Republic of China went into an era of long-term 
internal conflicts. Beginning 1926, the Nationalist party, which was originally 
founded by Sun Yatsen, began its North Expedition to reunify China. After two years 
of battle, the Nationalist party conquered Beijing on June 15, 1928, indicating that the 
Nanking government substituted the Beijing government to represent China in the 
international community. From June 15, 1928 to July 7, 1937, China enjoyed a 
relatively stable political environment and high economic growth under the leadership 
of the Nanking government in the history of China. Thus, this decade is referred to as 
the "Nanking decade" or "prewar decade" in Chinese history. 
While the Nanking decade was comparatively more stable than the preceding warlord 
era, it was still full of violence. The military confrontation between the Nanking 
government and the communists, which began in 1927, continued until the end of 
1936, when the Second United Front was founded. Intra-party frictions were also 
frequent during this period. Many provinces controlled by regional warlords retained 
their semi-independence in this decade. More seriously, the Japanese army began its 
aggression into China in this period. On September 18, 1931, the Japanese Army 
incited the Mukden incident and occupied Manchuria in the subsequent three months. 
Japan did not cease its aggression after this event. It launched several military actions 
in Shanghai, North China, and Inner Mongolia from 1932 to 1936. The preparation 
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for the incoming war between China and Japan was the central issue of the fiscal 
policy of the Nanking government. 
Fiscal Status during the Rule of the Nanking Government 
The fiscal status of the Nanking government was gyrating. The endless military 
conflicts in the Nanking decade caused a heavy burden on the government. 
Throughout the whole Nanking decade, the military expense increased, thus causing a 
large deficit for the government. 
Graph I Fiscal Status of China in the Nanking Decade 
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Data on the fiscal status are provided in Graphs 1, 2, and 3. These data are collected 
from Arthur N. Young's book "China's nation building effort, 1927 - 1937: The 
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financial and economic record." During the Nanking decade, the revenue increased 
steadily, but it was always unable to catch up with the large expenditure of the 
government. The constant budget deficit determines the vital reliance of the 
government on debt financing. 
Graph II Breakdown of Revenue 
400 ^ 
I 250 — — - . . . — ！ 
1 0 0 r; — 
^ ' U 丨丨_丨| 丨丨•奴》，、 • ™ ‘ — “ 
0 — —  — — — _ 、"“、彻.-k ^ . 二'多： 
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1 9 3 7 
Fiscal Year ending June 30 
—#-^ C'iistoivis -W-Snlt —Otlier Tnxes Miscellaiieon^; 
Government revenue was divided into four components: maritime custom revenue, 
salt tax, other taxes, and miscellaneous items. Maritime custom revenue was the most 
important financial source for the Nanking government and was used as secured 
collateral for many high-priority sovereign debts. The growth of the revenue was 
initially high because of the restoration of custom autonomy, but it slowed down after 
1932 because of the shrinking of international trade during the Great Depression. Salt 
tax was also a relatively stable income for the government; it was also used as secured 
collateral for sovereign debts. Other taxes steadily increased in the period and 
contributed to the growth of overall revenues. The most volatile part was the 
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miscellaneous items, which include railway income, revenue of central bank, 
contribution of provincial governments, and some non-recurrent items such as refund 
from loan service fund. 
Graph III Breakdown of Expenditures 
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Military expenditure and debt service were two major components of the government 
expenditures. Military expenditure increased rapidly and was quite volatile in this 
period. When military expenditure was extremely high compared with other years 
(e.g., 1931 and 1937), the government deficit was also at its high point. Debt service 
fee (including indemnities) was more stable and increased in a slower manner in this 
period. The settlement of foreign debts in 1936-1937 did not bring large incremental 
debt service expense. The volatile and ever-increasing military expenditure created 
great financing needs for the Nanking government. To meet the fiscal deficit, the 
government relied heavily on debt financing. 
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Graph IV Financing of the Government Deficit 
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Data on foreign debt are collected from "The foreign debt document of the Republic 
of China." Other data are sourced from Arthur N. Young's book. Domestic lending 
was the most important tool of the Nanking government for dealing with the large 
deficit. The flow of foreign debt financing was in an irregular manner. The Nanking 
government had difficulty in accessing the capital market because of the sovereign 
default of the Peking Regime. The foreign debts in 1932-1933 were mainly composed 
of the Food Relief Loan and the American Cotton and Wheat Loan provided by the 
U.S. After the large-scale restructuring began at the end of 1935, another inflow of 
foreign capital occurred in 1936 and 1937. However, the scale of foreign borrowing 
was still small compared with that of domestic lending. The reliance on domestic 
credit did not change after China's access to the capital market was restored. It even 
reached its peak on the eve of the war between China and Japan. The influence of the 
restoration of foreign credits on the fiscal status of China was limited. The other 
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financing method mainly includes bank loans and overdrafts from central banks and 
commercial banks. They were mainly used for short-term financing to cover the 
deficit, which could not be financed by domestic bonds and foreign borrowings. 
Silver Standard and Currency Reform in 1935 
The currency reform in 1935 was a milestone event in the economic history of the 
Republic of China. China had a long history of using silver as the medium of 
transaction since the Song Dynasty. The silver standard of the Republic of China was 
adopted in 1914, in which one Chinese yuan was equal to 0.72 tael of 90% fine silver. 
When the Great Depression broke out, the price of silver dropped dramatically. Thus, 
the Chinese currency depreciated against other countries on the gold standard. This 
depreciation helped China avoid severe deflation and depression that occurred in 
Western countries, protecting the Chinese economy until 1933. However, the 
American Silver Purchase Act of 1934 created an intolerable demand on silver, then 
incurring a deep deflation and recession in 1934-1935. Stocks of silver in banks in 
Shanghai fell from C$563 million to C$335 million in the last half of 1934, and the 
indexes of wholesale prices in Shanghai and Canton reached their trough in 1935. (I 
use $ to denote U.S. Dollar and C$ to denote Chinese currency thereafter.) Young 
described the recession in his book as follows: "During 1934, the interest charged by 
native banks rose from about 6 to 16 percent per annum. In January 1935, the 
premium on selling foreign exchange for cash against a month's delivery rose as high 
as 27 percent per annum. It became almost impossible to borrow at any rate" (1971, p. 
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221). 
The Nanking government did not wait to see the situation become worse. As Young 
(1971) wrote in his book, in October 1934，the government announced a 10% duty on 
the export of silver dollars and mint bars to isolate the domestic silver price from the 
world market. However, this effort was greatly offset by the Japanese smuggling of 
silver in North China. The temptation of smuggling was even intensified when the 
price of silver rose from around $0.50 per ounce to $0.81 per ounce half a year later. 
The price of silver dropped to $0.65 on August 1935 and maintained this value on the 
eve of the currency reform. 
The dramatic increase in silver price forced the government to consider a currency 
reform to replace the silver coin with bank notes. However, this transformation was 
not easy because the government had to contend with a market psychology that 
connected confidence with a steady exchange rate. After the disastrous fiscal status of 
China in the 1920s, public confidence on the Chinese government was low in both 
domestic and foreign market. Specifically, with many foreign and domestic debts in 
arrears and a large recurring fiscal deficit, the Chinese government was widely 
doubted for its ability to control money supply after the switch to a fiat money system. 
Despite the prolonged debate, the Chinese government formally adopted the legal 
note system and forbid the circulation of silver on November 3, 1935. It also 
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expressed its determination to attain fiscal probity and price stability by announcing 
that the government budget should be balanced within 18 months. The market 
received the reform with suspicion, and speculation on the exchange rate was soon 
initiated. As Young (1971) recorded, Japanese banks launched a tentative attack by 
buying $1.25 million from the Central Bank only one week after the currency reform. 
This amount was not small considering that the initial reserve of China was only $30 
million. Improvement on public confidence became a crucial task for the Nanking 
government to ensure the continuing success of currency reform. 
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Section III. Sovereign Default and Restructuring Episodes of the Nanking 
Government 
Data 
There is no satisfactory statistics on the sovereign debt status of the Nanking 
government, and thus I have to collect it myself. The main data source of my paper is 
"The historical documents of foreign debts of the Republic of China," a series of 
historical documents collected by some Chinese scholars. It contains 12 volumes and 
about 500-700 items on debts borrowed during the Qing Dynasty and the Republic of 
China. Each debt item includes a brief summary and some relevant government 
official documents (i.e., contracts, announcement, correspondence, etc.). All 
information is written in simplified Chinese and must be collected manually. Some 
subjective judgment is involved in the transformation of text information to numerical 
data. 
I collect information on about 186 old debts borrowed by the previous regimes and 
inherited by the Nanking government, along with 34 new debts borrowed by the 
Nanking government during the prewar decade. The sovereign default and 
restructuring episodes mainly refer to the problem of "old debts" inherited from the 
Peking Regime because the debt service of new debts can be made on time in most 
cases. 
The debt service status of the 186 old debts is different. Among them, 101 debts were 
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restructured, 12 debts did not default (or the payment had been resumed by the Peking 
Regime), and 73 debts were still in arrears when the war broke out. 
Sovereign Debt as a Heritage 
The issue of unsettled foreign debts was actually a heritage of the Late Qing Dynasty 
and the Peking Regime. China's large-scale foreign borrowing began in 1895. After 
the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Qing government was forced to pay huge 
amounts of reparations. Following this, the Qing administration had to borrow from 
Western powers, including Britain, Germany, France, and Russia, to fund the 
indemnity. This borrowing caused the first batch of large-sum foreign debt, including 
the Russo-French Loan and Anglo-German Sterling Loan. The Boxer Indemnity, 
which was imposed by Western powers in 1901, put even more burden on China's 
fiscal status, leaving the country highly indebted from then on. In this period, the 
Qing government also borrowed foreign loans to build railways. Many railroads were 
constructed at the beginning of the century with the aid of foreign capital. 
The Revolution of 1911 ended the Imperial era of China. The Beijing government 
succeeded the Qing government to represent China between 1912 and 1928 in 
international society. Upon the establishment of the Republic of China, the 
government recognized all debts borrowed from world powers to gain international 
support. Soon, the Peking Regime began to borrow a huge debt ("Reorganization 
Loan") to finance its conflicts against southern revolutionists. The reliance on external 
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finance became even more serious at the beginning of the Republic of China. 
After Yuan Shikai's death, the Peking Regime went into long-term internal conflict. 
The resources of the Peking Regime were meager. After 1919-1920, no formal budget 
was prepared. V.K. Wellington Koo, the Finance Minister in 1926, said in a published 
report that the actual income of the Peking regime was only C$1 million per month, 
half of which was supported by the loan. 
The chaotic fiscal status inevitably brought widespread defaults of Chinese sovereign 
debts. The sovereign default episode began in 1920, when disagreements between 
Zhili Faction and Anhui Faction turned into military confrontations. More and more 
debts gradually fell into arrears. In 1928, when the Nanking government took over the 
whole country, only 12 of the 186 old debts could be serviced, with all of them 
collateralized by maritime custom revenue or salt tax. All internal debts were in 
default at the same time. 
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Graph V Time Distribution of Borrowing and Defaulting of Old Debts 
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The estimation of the exact amount of debts that the Nanking government owed to 
foreign creditors was difficult. China did not have a clear document to record the 
exact amount of external debt owed to foreign creditors because of long-term 
domestic conflicts. The only method left for us is to add the amount of all debts. Note 
that, strictly speaking, the Boxer Indemnity is not a "debt," but its contract is very 
similar to other sovereign debts. The Chinese government usually treats it as an 
ordinary foreign debt; therefore, we include it in our estimate. Excluding the 
renounced and canceled portions, the principal amount of the Boxer Indemnity was 
about $128 million. The total principal amount of the 12 debts, which were receiving 
service, was $224 million. Therefore, in total, $352 million of debts received service. 
The amount of 174 defaulted debts was $426 million. The total principal amount of 
foreign debts of China was $778 million, which is equivalent to C$1656 million, a 
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number equivalent to five times of the unborrowed revenue of the Nanking 
government in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1929. If we add in the interest arrears, 
this number could be even larger. 
This estimate is close to that of other scholars. Chinese historian Wu Jingping (1993) 
estimates the total obligation of secured debts owed to foreign creditors to be C$744. 
The total amount of the Boxer Indemnity was C$569 million. However, the Ministry 
of Finance estimated the unsecured debt to amount to C$407 million, and the Ministry 
of Communication (including railways) estimated that amount to be C$385 million. 
Adding these figures yield C$2106 million. The difference is due to the included 
interest arrears in the estimate. Moreover, Wu Jingping does not exclude the 
renounced Russian portion of the Boxer Indemnity, which inappropriately exaggerates 
the amount. 
The financial advisor of Nanking Government, Arthur N. Young, made another 
estimate in his book, "China's nation building effort, 1927-1937: The financial and 
economic record." He estimates that the foreign currency debt, which receives full 
service, is about $323 million. The foreign currency debt already in default has 
accumulated to $321 million. The total foreign currency debt has amounted to $644 
million at that time. Young excludes the Nishihara loan in his estimate, which has 
never been recognized by the Nationalist government. If we add this number to the 
total, the amount will sum up to $720 million, which is very close to my estimate. The 
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difference is that Young ignores the foreign debt dominating the Chinese currency in 
his estimate. 
What does this amount mean for China? By adding the multiples of the principal 
amount and the interest rate together, we can obtain $44 million (C$95 million). 
Therefore, if China had serviced all foreign debts in 1928, the interest burden on the 
fiscal year of 1929 would be at least about 28% of the total unborrowed revenue, 
assuming no debt was retired. 
The Chinese GDP is estimated to have reached about $29.58 billion in 1931 (Liu 
and Yeh 1965). The amount of debt (C$1,656 billion) is about 5% of this number. This 
amount seems to be not too much for China compared with the high GDP-to-DEBT 
ratio in the contemporary world. However, China was still in an agrarian economy 
then, and the modernized industry constituted only 3% of its GDP. The conflicts 
between the central government and the regional warlords and communists also 
greatly weakened the tax collectability of the Nanking government. This amount was 
a great burden for the gyrating fiscal status of the Nanking government. 
Background Information on the Debts 
Aside from the estimate of the total amount, statistical properties can also enhance our 
knowledge about the old debts. I collect information from documents. Some of the 
following statistics may rely on a subjective interpretation of the background 
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information provided in the documents. 
Table II Purpose of the Old Debts (Amount in $1 Million) 
Purpose Railway Telecom Industrial Military Admin 
Number 107 11 18 18 32 
Amount 241.35 16.05 22.33 116.68 253.83 
(Note: "Railway" indicates railway debts; "Telecom" indicates telecommunication 
debts; "Industrial" indicates debts used to finance investment in other industries 
excluding railway and telecommunication; "Military" indicates debts used to finance 
military operations; and "Admin" indicates debts used to finance general 
administration expenses, including indemnity, debt services, and other government 
expenses). 
The table shows that most (57%) of the old debts were used to finance the operation 
of the Late Qing and Peking governments. Railway debts mainly used to finance the 
construction and development of railroads also constitute a large portion of the 
foreign debts. The amount of other debts is comparatively small. 
Table III Lending Countries of the Old Debts (Amount in $1 Million) 
Country U.K. U.S. Japan France Germany Belgium Multiple Others 
Number 46 40 58 8 11 14 8 1 
Amount 141.65 29.83 237.65 97.98 88.27 54.86 - 0.01 
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Table III describes the country distribution of the old debts. I divide the debts 
borrowed from multiple countries to each creditor respectively according to their 
shares. Japan is the biggest creditor for China, and the U.K., France, Germany, and 
Belgium have a large stake in China. 
Table IV Collateral of the Old Debts (Amount in $1 Million) 
Collateral Custom Salt Tax Bond Asset Unknown 
Number 6 6 15 6 39 126 
Amount 160.24 60.19 123.33 26.58 220.24 280.09 
I use "Custom" to denote the debts backed by maritime custom revenue, "Salt" to 
denote debts backed by salt tax, "Tax" to denote debts backed by other government 
taxes, "Asset" to denote debts backed by state-own enterprises' asset and revenue 
(usually railway companies), and "Bond" to denote debts backed by other domestic 
bonds. Studying the collateral status of the old debts is worthwhile in our analysis. 
The 12 debts receiving service are backed by either maritime custom revenue or salt 
tax. They are called "secured debts" in the government document of the Republic of 
China. Other debts are all unsecured debts. All unsecured debts had fallen into arrears 
since the inception of the Nanking government. 
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Table V Currency Denomination of the Old Debts (Amount in $1 Million) 
Currency CNY GBP USD JPY FRF DEM Belgium 
Number 67 44 23 42 6 1 3 
Amount 17.20 398.90 21.31 206.26 6.45 0.02 0.10 
British pounds (GBP) and Japanese yen (JPY) were the two currencies used most 
frequently in the debt contracts of China. Therefore, the exchange rate fluctuation of 
the Chinese currency to GBP and JPY (which is unofficially pegged to GBP) was 
crucial for the debt service capability of the Nanking government. 
The Restructuring Episode 
The Chinese government made attempts to settle debt in arrears quickly after the 
default. In 1921-1922, the Peking government established a Commission for 
Readjustment of Finance after the Washington Conference. International community 
also focused on the sovereign debt problem of China. In 1920, banking groups from 
the U.K., France, Japan, and U.S. established the China consortium to coordinate their 
investments in China. Foreign creditors pressed the settlement of old debts frequently 
through the consortium. However, no resolution was attained, given the meager fiscal 
status of the Peking Regime. The task of the rehabilitation of credit was finally passed 
down to the Nationalist government. 
There was a shift in the attitude of the Nationalist party towards foreign debt. When 
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planning the revolution in the first Nationalist Congress in January 1924, the party 
declared that China should not repay the foreign loans contracted by an irresponsible 
government to maintain the power of warlords. As the North Expedition progressed, 
and the communists were purged in 1927, the attitude of the Nationalists changed 
dramatically. Eventually, they recognized all old obligations when they controlled the 
whole of China in 1928, except the Nishihara loans. 
The issue of the Nishihara loans was the biggest obstacle in the negotiations. The 
Nishihara loans, composed by 8 loans and amounts to $93 million, were borrowed by 
the Duan Qimi government to suppress the Nationalist dissidents in the South. The 
loans were provided by Japanese creditors at the expense of territorial concessions 
and rights in North China. The Nanking government refused to recognize this loan 
under the great pressure of public opinion, whereas the Japanese government insisted 
on the recognition of the whole loan. A general settlement plan could not be 
completed without the resolution of the problem of the Nishihara loans. 
The hope for a general settlement was finally destroyed by the Japanese invasion into 
Manchuria in 1931. The settlement of Japanese debts in Manchuria also became 
impossible as a result. The railway debts in Manchuria were exclusively borrowed 
from Japan at a principal amount of $38 million at that time. Excluding these debts 
and the Nishihara loans, the total amount of sovereign debt for the Nanking 
government was $570 million. A total of $275 million of these debts received service, 
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and $295 million of the debts was in arrears. 
The Nanking government finally became determined to conduct restructuring on an 
individual basis. For each debt, the Ministry of Finance, Railway, and 
Telecommunications discussed with the creditor to have an agreement. The agreement 
was then submitted to a debt readjustment committee responsible for the final 
decision on the restructuring proposal. The proposal was modified with the committee 
and then returned to the creditor and ministry for further discussion until a final 
agreement was made. The following graph illustrates the time distribution of the 
restructuring event which is beneficial for our analysis. 
Graph VI Restructuring Time Distributions 
一 2 5 0 
o 
S 200 . 1 
''' ———————————————.—-.....———— —— f 
100 1 
一 
U ， “ “ 1 “‘ ‘ "… "’““ 1 ——-— 7 """""""i "“ r 
J an-^O 丨 .Tmi-34 T a n . T a n - 3 ( S .Tan-37 
(Note: The vertical axis denotes the recognized total amount of old debts.) 
Before 1933, not much restructuring was conducted on the old debts. Between 1933 
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and 1935, some small-amount debts were restructured, but the amount only 
constituted less than 30% of the total renegotiated amount. The situation changed 
dramatically in the late 1935, when the internal condition of China caused the 
government finally decide to resolve the sovereign debt problem. According to the 
graph, the last 20 months of the prewar decade contributed over 70% of the total 
settled amount. Specifically, the settlement of all publicly traded bonds and 
syndicated bank loans was done in this period. 
The milestone of the restucturing practice was the settlement of the Tientsin-Pukow 
railway loan (including the Tientsin-Pukow bond and the Tientsin-Pukow 
supplementary bond) in early 1936. The two Tiestin-Pukow railway loans combined 
are the largest debts in arrears in our sample. This debt was issued in 1908 to 1911 to 
finance the construction of the Tienstin-Pukow railway. The outstanding principal was 
GBP6,150,000 before the settlement. The contract of this loan contains an important 
contigent clause, which requires the government to provide the contigent security of 
customs revenue. The core of the clause is that if likin (the domestic tariff) is 
abolished in connection with tariff revision, an equivalent charge on the increased 
custom revenue should be substituted. When likin was abolished in January 1931, the 
bondholder promptly asked the provision of customs revenue for debt service. The 
British, American, and French governments also supported their claims. However, the 
Chinese government did not have any reponse to the creditors' claim. The financial 
postion of the railway also provided basis for bond holders to critize the Chinese 
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government. By the end of 1935, the net earnings of the Tientsin-Pukow railway was 
about C$8 million, which is about twice of the amount required for debt service. Most 
of the revenue was used for payments to the military and debt service of Chinese bank 
loans and other debts. The creditors were angry about the attitude of the Chinese 
government because they believed that the Chinese government was unwilling to 
repay. 
The faith of the bondholders changed after the currency reform. The government 
made a proposal for the loan together with the Hukuang railway loan on November 11, 
1935. The proposal was delivered to bond holders in Europe, and these bond holders 
accepted the proposal without any material modification. Finally, the government 
announced the settlement on February 26, 1936 in the form of an offer to bondholders, 
accepetance of which their committee recommended. 
The restructuring progressed rapidly after the settlement of the Tiestin-Pukow loans. 
All sovereign bonds of China traded in London were restructured by April 1937. On 
the eve of the war in July 1937, the principal amount of debt in arrears was reduced 
from $299 million to $102 million by the Nanking government (excluding the 
Nishihara Loan and railway debts in Manchuria). Not only the debts owed to Western 
powers but also those to the Japanese were settled to ensure intra-creditor equity. The 
total amount of debts (including the principal and interest arrears) was $350 million. 
China recognized $210 million of the total amount; thus, the average recovery rate 
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was 60%. Compared with that in other studies, the recovery rate was moderate. 
Benjamin and Wright's (2009) research based on the sovereign debt renegotiation of 
73 countries between 1990 and 2003 records an average recovery rate of about 60%/ 
Many unsettled debts were also in the process of renegotiation. If the Sino-Japanese 
war had not broken out, the Nanking government would have been able to settle all 
foreign debts eventually. 
Market Reactions 
Bond market performances are a useful measurement of the investor's reaction 
towards the restructuring practice. I present the background information and weekly 
price data on five government bonds and eight railway bonds of the Republic of China 
traded in the London Stock Exchange in the Appendix I and 11. The data sources are 
the books "The historical documents of foreign debts of the Republic of China" and 
"Bankers' weekly." All data are manually collected from the original text written in 
Chinese. The "Banker's weekly"(‘ 银行月刊” in Chinese) began its publication in 
May 1917 and ended in March 1950. This magazine was published by the Shanghai 
Banking Association on a weekly basis. It began to quote the weekly price of Chinese 
sovereign bonds traded in London Stock Exchange beginning 1933. 
The bonds included in our research can be classified into two categories according to 
their repayment status. The interest payment of five government bonds and two 
railway bonds (i.e., Shanghai-Nanking and Shanghai-Hangchou-Ningpo) was made in 
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most cases, although there was some delay in the principal retirement of Crisp, 
Anglo-French, and Shanghai-Nanking railway bonds occasionally. Their 
performances were generally good throughout the whole period. The bondholders of 
the remaining six railroad bonds did not receive one dollar before the settlement. Thus, 
the prices of these bonds were quite low at the beginning. 
When the attitude of the government towards old debts changed dramatically in late 
1935，the prices of the six bonds in arrears began to soar. The market welcomed the 
settlement, although they suffered a substantial haircut in the restructuring process. 
The final completion of the settlement of Tienstin-Pukow loans on Feb 26, 1936 
further boosted the confidence of the investors. The price of all Chinese bonds jumped 
around the settlement date. Specifically, the prices of the four defaulted bonds 
increased by 30% on average in five weeks. As such, the investor viewed the 
restructuring of the Tiestin-Pukow loans not only as a settlement of the loans 
themselves but also as a signal that China had made up its mind to resolve the 
sovereign debt problem. The confidence of the investors on the reputation of the 
whole country was greatly improved by the settlements. 
On the eve of the war, all Chinese sovereign bonds enjoyed a large increase in their 
price compared with their price levels in late 1935. The yield to maturities of all 
Chinese sovereign bonds decreased to lower than 7%, except the Lunghai railway 
bond, which was a great success considering the widespread default in the 1930s. 
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Specifically, the credit of the Chinese government even surpassed that of its enemy, 
Japan. On July 5, 1937, Japan's 5% sterling loan of 1907 with 1947 final maturity 
yielded 7.5 percent, which is higher than the yields of most Chinese sovereign bonds. 
The settlement of old debts successfully restored the reputation of China in the 
international capital market. 
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Section IV Capital Market Access and Reputational Theories in the 
Restructuring Episode 
Access to the International Capital Market 
Access to the international capital market is considered the decisive force in sovereign 
lending in the reputational models. In Eaton and Gersovitz's (1981) reputational 
models, access to capital markets is a punishment mechanism of creditors to maintain 
the functioning of repeated sovereign debt games. In Cole, Dow, and English's (1995) 
signaling model, partial or full settlement of old debt serves as a signal of 
trustworthiness. By observing this signal, the investors move the country from the list 
of "bad borrowers" to that of "good borrowers" and grant access to capital market to 
the country again. A common implication is that the fear of losing access to 
international capital market is the ultimate motivation for sovereign borrowers to 
repay. 
To examine the explanatory power of reputational models in our case, a study on the 
relationship between the restructuring episode and capital market access of the 
Nanking government is necessary. As shown in Section III, I present data on all the 
new debts borrowed by the Nanking government in the prewar decade from the "The 
foreign debt document of the Republic of China." The data include information about 
34 items on debt. An important characteristic of the data is that the actual borrowed 
amount is smaller than the contract amount in most debts. In some large debts, 
creditors specify a maximum credit limit in the contract. The borrower can buy goods 
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and services without cash under this limit. However, in reality, the borrower suddenly 
exhausts the credit limit of contracts. For example, in the American Cotton and Wheat 
Loan, the United States agreed to provide China a $50 million credit limit，but China 
only bought $17.08 million worth of U.S. goods. Thus, the actual borrowed amount is 
much less than the contracted amount. In total, the actual borrowed amount of new 
debts was $79 million, whereas the contract amount was $163 million. The following 
graph shows the time distribution of the new debt obtained by the Nanking 
government in the prewar decade. 
Graph VI Time Distribution of New Debts Obtained during the Nanking Government 
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The Nanking government obtained many new debts, although the debt in arrears 
accompanied this regime in the entire prewar decade. Even before the large-scale 
settlement of old debts, the Chinese government was able to borrow a significant 
amount of money from the international capital market. After the large-scale 
settlement began in late 1935, there was a larger flow of foreign credits into China. 
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Considering the drying international capital market in the 1930s, the scale of 
borrowing was not insignificant. China even managed to issue a new sterling bond 
called "the 6% Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway Completion Loan" in June 1936, 
which was the only public foreign bond issued by the Nanking government in the 
prewar decade. Detailed information about this bond is listed in the Appendix I. 
Overall, the Nanking government maintained its continuing access to capital market 
in the prewar decade. 
The comparison of contract terms between new debts and old debts can provide some 
insights into the condition of China's capital market access. Given the limited data 
available, running a rigorous econometric regression to test the difference is difficult. 
However, I still make some rough comparisons. If I use the 2.5% U.K. consol rate 
(data from Global Financial Data) as the benchmark, the weighted average credit 
spread of new debts over will be about 2.4%, whereas the weighted average credit 
spread of old debts will be about 2.8%. Thus, the contract terms of new debts even 
improve slightly compared with those of the old debts. Comparing the credit spread of 
the old and new public bonds, the credit spread of the 6% 
Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway Completion Loan is about 3.0%, whereas the 
average issuing credit spread of the seven railway bonds is about 2.6%. Although the 
credit spread of the new bond is slightly higher, such slight differences may not be 
understood as higher borrowing cost, given the possible widening risk spread after the 
Great Depression. 
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Relevance of the Traditional Reputational Model 
The key assumption of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981),s traditional reputational model is 
that the defaulting country would be punished by the creditors in the form of cutoff 
from the international capital market. This punishment could be costly enough to 
enforce the defaulting sovereign to repay in the end. In our case, I could identify some 
evidence of the reputational punishment. However, the power of the reputational 
punishment seemed too weak to enforce the sovereign debt repayment. 
As Cole, Dow, and English (1995) discuss, reputational punishment can be 
implemented in two forms. First, old creditors can use courts to seize proceeds of new 
loans. This is unlikely in our case because of the issue of sovereign immunity in 
British and American courts. Also no evidence of such punishment could be found in 
the historical documents. The second form is more likely to occur in our case. It says 
old creditors can form a cartel to block new loans if the defaulting country wishes to 
borrow before repayment. We can find some evidence of this mechanism in the case 
of the China Consortium. The China Consortium was organized by banking groups 
from the U.S., U.K., France, and Japan to “check and control national rivalries" 
(Young 1971, p. 362) and "afford a workable procedure to provide foreign capital for 
proper purposes in China" (Young 1971, p. 362). China refused to deal with the 
Consortium at the beginning for fear of a financial monopoly. The Consortium was 
proved to be able to block some transactions indeed. However, the cartel was proved 
ineffective when U.S. granted the Food Relief Loan and American Cotton and Wheat 
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Loan to China in 1933, long before the large-scale settlement. Japan and U.K. 
complained about behavior of U.S. because they believed that granting a large credit 
to China when there were still large outstanding debts in arrears violated the essence 
of the consortium. The U.S. ignored the complaints because it had its own purpose for 
granting these two loans. In addition, the amount of unsettled claims owned by the 
U.S. was comparatively small, thus weakening the incentive of U.S. to conduct the 
punishment. When China began its large-scale settlement in late 1935, the Consortium 
became more useless when large foreign credits flowed into China without any 
involvement of the Consortium. Finally, the China Consortium was dissolved in early 
1937, as the British and American governments found it to exist in name only. 
Based on the China Consortium case, the reputational sanction was not very effective 
in the restructuring episode of China. An effective mechanism for reputational 
sanction is for the creditor to grant no access to the capital market to the defaulting 
sovereign borrower unless the debt in arrears is settled completely. The reason is that 
if the sovereign creditor grants access to the international capital market to the 
sovereign borrower before the settlement of debt in arrears is complete, it will not 
have enough bargaining power to enforce the repayment of remaining debt in arrears. 
Noting this fact, the sovereign borrower will only leave the remaining debt in arrears 
unsettled because it can still regain access to the international capital market without 
settlement. However, this fact is not consistent in my case. In the restructuring 
episode of China, old creditors attempted to block some transactions when many 
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foreign debts remained unsettled; however, this ability was limited. When China 
began its large-scale settlement, the reputational punishment was soon canceled, and 
the cartel existed in name only. 
One may argue that the Chinese government could be punished by significantly 
imposing higher borrowing cost on it instead of completely excluding it from capital 
markets. This idea sounds reasonable to some extent. However, I cannot find any 
significant difference between the contract terms of the new debts and the old debts as 
discussed earlier. It seems that the magnitude of the reputational punishment is at least 
insignificant compared with the other factors in determining the contract terms. 
The ineffectiveness of the reputational sanction is due to the nature of the unstable 
cooperation between lenders. The relationship between lenders is similar to an 
oligopoly, in which cooperation is not an equilibrium strategy because some lenders 
can easily get better off by exiting the cartel. Organizing lenders in different countries 
is especially difficult in practice because of conflicts of national interest between 
different countries. 
In sum, I find some efforts of old creditors to coordinate to impose costs on the 
Nanking government. However, the magnitude of the punishment seemed small 
compared with the prediction of the traditional reputational model. This result may be 
explained by the nature of unstable cooperation between a number of lenders from 
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different countries. The key setting in the traditional reputational model is that 
creditors punish the defaulting sovereign that pays less than its obligation by 
excluding it from the international capital market. This idea originates from the 
conception of infinitely repeated game between the creditors and the borrowers. 
However, because of the large amount of lenders and conflicts of interest between 
their governments, the benefit from maintaining a cartel was small compared to a 
deviation from the cooperation for some lenders in some circumstances. Noting this, 
China did not find much difficulty to circumvent the cartel to get foreign credits. 
Signaling Model and Role of Reputation 
In the signaling model, Cole, Dow, and English (1995) propose another enforcement 
mechanism based on the role of capital market access. In their model, creditors do not 
punish defaulting sovereign intentionally. However, creditors view the sovereign 
default as a signal of untmstworthiness, and, as a result, they refuse to lend to 
defaulting sovereigns. A partial or general settlement can signal a change in the time 
preference of the defaulting sovereign to be more forward-looking so it can be trusted 
again to repay. Therefore, a settlement is necessary for the defaulting sovereign to 
regain access to the international capital market. 
The mechanism in the signaling model seems to be more consistent with our case. 
The large-scale settlement of old debts beginning in late 1935 was an efficient signal 
that changed the perception of foreign creditors on the credibility of the Chinese 
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government. The prices of all Chinese sovereign bonds traded in the London Stock 
Exchange increased significantly right after November 1935 when the Chinese 
resumed its negotiation with foreign bondholders. When the first two bonds were 
settled in February 1936, not only did the two bonds but also the other unsettled bonds 
significantly increased in price. Foreign credits began to flow into China right after 
the settlement began. The Chinese government was also able to issue a public bond in 
June 1936 even when three railway bonds were still unsettled. Therefore, the 
large-scale settlement indeed changed the expectation of the creditors. The reputation 
of China in the capital market improved largely in early 1936, despite the fact that the 
settlement was far from being completed in early 1936. Hence, through the signaling 
of the large-scale settlement of old debts, the Nanking government successfully 
"regained" access to the capital market. The events that transpired in late 1935-mid 
1937 are consistent with the signaling model. 
However, there are two problems about the signaling model. The first is that whether 
signaling by repayment is necessary for regaining capital market access. Actually, 
there is no issue of "regaining capital market access" in our case, because the Chinese 
government was already able to lend in the international credit market even before the 
large-scale settlement. The foreign lending before November 1935 constituted about 
46% of the total borrowing of the Nanking government in the prewar decade. 
Although the reputation and borrowing condition of China improved after the 
large-scale restructuring practice, we cannot deny that access to the capital market 
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was already partially available for the Chinese government even before the settlement. 
The result reveals an imperfection in the signaling model. The settlement of old debts 
is a very important signal in sovereign lending, but it may not be the only signal to 
show willingness to pay. In the signaling model, Cole, Dow, and English (1995) argue, 
"The settlement appeared to be a prerequisite for obtaining new loans." However, 
they do not give any evidence to support this argument. As such, Sole (2007) claims 
that lenders respond to default based on the additional knowledge about borrowers 
acquired during default episodes. If the borrowing government can signal the 
profitability of its project in other methods, it can still obtain new funds despite 
default on old debts. Thus, settlement is not the only way to signal the credibility of 
the defaulting sovereign. 
The case of the Food Relief Loan in 1932 and the American Cotton and Wheat Loan 
in 1933 is a good example for Sole's argument. The two loans are the main 
components of the foreign debts borrowed before the large-scale settlement. The total 
amount of these two loans is $26.3 million, which is about 33% of the total foreign 
debt of the Nanking government. The interest rates for these two loans are 4% for 
Food Relief Loan and 5% for American Cotton and Wheat Loan, which are lower 
than the average interest rate of new debts of 5.43%. To secure such a large amount of 
debt, the Nanking government used two methods to signal its trustworthiness. First, 
the Nanking government agreed to use the consolidated tax plus a charge on the 5% 
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flood relief surtax as collateral. The maritime customs revenue was the most stable 
income for China. All debts secured on maritime customs revenue did not have any 
default history. Second, the U.S. government was actively involved in these two loans. 
President Roosevelt even signed his name on the loan contract. This agreement 
created a potential additional penalty for China if it wished to repudiate the debt. Both 
measures created an effective enforcement mechanism for repayment, which signals 
the credibility of the Chinese government on servicing these two loans. Actually, even 
in the Sino-Japanese war when most Chinese bonds had fallen into arrears, the 
Nanking government continued the payment of these two loans until they were 
completely paid off. 
The case of the two loans is a good supplement to the signaling model. Repudiation 
and lending resumption may be the most important signals that can change the 
lender's expectation on the sovereign borrower. Nevertheless, lenders can receive 
other types of signals that significantly influence their decisions. Sovereign default 
does not necessarily result in a complete cut-off of access to the international capital 
market. 
The second problem of the signaling model is its inability to explain the timing of the 
settlement. Even if improving capital market access alone could motivate the 
settlement in our case, the Nanking government did not necessarily have to do it in 
late 1935. In the signaling model, the direct trigger of the settlement is the change in 
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the time preferences of the government, which is assumed exogenous in the model. 
Cole, Dow, and English (1995) use the example of election to illustrate the exogenous 
change in the time preference of the government. This setting is convenient in 
constructing a theoretical model, but it also hinders us from exploring more about the 
motivation of the settlement. In our case, I cannot find such significant exogenous 
change in the political status of the Nanking government. Still there was a sharp 
change in the attitude of the government towards the settlement of old debts. Thus, the 
change in time preferences may be endogenous to a possible external shock of the 
government instead of a change in the government itself. Exploring the underlying 
mechanism of the change in time preferences is necessary to give a consistent 
explanation on the restructuring episode. 
In fact, the importance of improving capital market access seems not as important as 
predicted by the signaling model in our case. The amount of new debts ($43 million) 
obtained after the large-scale settlement turns out to be much smaller than the total 
recognized amount of old debts ($210 million). This amount is also only $7 million 
higher than the amount borrowed before the large-scale settlement. The continuing 
reliance of the Nanking government on domestic bonds proves that the Nanking 
government did not consider the foreign debt as a major financing method even 
though the borrowing condition had been improved. In retrospect, the benefit of 
improving capital market access is limited compared with the cost of the settlement. 
This view is reflected in Young's book in which he wrote, "And they (government 
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officials) felt that foreign credits were desirable if not essential to ensure the 
continuing success of the reform, although credits proved unnecessary" (1971, p.l58). 
This also shows that the Nanking government already had some expectations about 
the limited outcome of the settlement on improving capital market access. 
Overall, the signaling model is useful in explaining the flow of foreign credits after 
the large-scale settlement. However, it still cannot give a satisfactory explanation on 
the motivation of the large-scale settlement of the Nanking government. Improving 
capital market access alone seems insufficient to motivate the settlement in our case. 
The inclusion of the non-debt arenas in the analysis may provide a more consistent 
explanation on the restructuring episode of the Nanking government. 
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Section V Role of Sanctions in the Restructuring Episode 
Analytical Framework of the Sanctions Model 
The traditional reputational model and signaling model have been proven 
unsatisfactory in explaining our case; thus, I proceed with the analysis using the 
sanctions model to explain further. To begin, we must give a clear definition of the 
sanctions model. Unlike reputational models, which are higlighted by their emphasis 
on the role of maintaining access to the international capital market, the sanctions 
model has no clear definition. This phenomenon has something to do with the history 
of the sanctions model. The sanctions model was originally proposed by Bulow and 
Rogoff (1989) in two papers to disprove Eaton and Gersovitz's reputational model. In 
the first paper, they prove that the threat of cutting off capital market access alone is 
unable to sustain sovereign borrowing and repayment. They argue that if and only if 
the lenders are able to impose additional and costlier penalties beyond the cut-off of 
access to international capital market, then the sovereign debt market can still exist. 
The technique is that Bulow and Rogoff never give a clear definition of the 
"additional and costlier penalties beyond the cut-off of access to international capital 
market." That is, any incentive, which can enforce the sovereign borrower to repay 
except the access to the capital market, can be explained within their framework of 
the sanctions model. If a case cannot be explained by the reputational models, then it 
must be explained by the sanctions model. 
Clearly, such an irrefutable definition can help us gain little knowledge of the 
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sovereign lending practice. Noting this result, Bulow and Rogoff wrote a second 
paper entitled "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt" in the same year. 
In this paper, they emphasize the sovereign creditors' ability to go to the creditor 
country's courts and influence their domestic legislators. Such sanctions can hurt the 
ability of defaulting sovereigns to transact freely in the foreign financial and goods 
markets. The country may be forced to conduct their trade in a roundabout way to 
avoid seizure. The country may also be blocked from accessing short-term trade 
credits. These costs, although not very large, can be influential enough to enforce 
sovereign debt repayment. 
Other types of sanctions have been found in historical case studies. In Conklin's (1998) 
studies on the sovereign defaults of Spain in the century, Genoese bankers link 
the species deliveries from Spain to Low Countries to create an additional penalty for 
the default. According to Weidenmeir's (2004) research, the threat of direct sanctions 
from important bondholders, such as trade embargo of weapons, enforced debt service 
of the Southern Confederacy in the American Civil War, which was considered to 
have no reputation at all. Unlike in Conklin's case, the sanctions were never realized 
however. 
The models of Cole and Kehoe (1998) and Sandleris (2008) also bear some 
resemblance with the sanctions model, although I call them general reputational 
model or informational model. Cole and Kehoe's general reputational model 
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emphasizes that a sovereign default can damage the reputation of the defaulting 
sovereign in other non-debt relationships, including trust relationship. Sandleris's 
information model states that a sovereign default will reveal negative information 
about the sovereign borrower to both domestic and foreign agents. Similar to the 
sanctions models, they emphasize that the main cost of sovereign default comes from 
non-debt relationships. In this sense, these models can also be considered variants of 
the sanctions model. However, there is one important difference between these two 
models and the previous three papers on the sanctions model. In these two models, the 
cost is a natural result of the cost-benefit analysis of foreign creditors and 
governments. In the sanctions models, the cost is a game strategy triggered by 
sovereign default, which usually brings little benefits to the imposer. As a result, we 
can observe an immediate punishment imposed by the old creditors as a trigger 
strategy in case of default if the sanctions model is true. However, we may only 
observe a gradual deterioration of the non-debt relationship with all economic agents 
otherwise. 
Therefore, the central assumption of the sanctions model is that the original creditors 
can commit to giving a costly punishment to the defaulting sovereign as a trigger 
strategy in the sovereign lending game. The most convenient method for empirical 
testing of the sanctions model is to explore the existence of explicit or potential 
sanctions imposed by the original creditors on the defaulting sovereign, although the 
existence of potential sanctions is difficult to verify in reality. 
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Three Possible Channels of Direct Sanctions 
Turning back to our case, the purpose of this section is to determine whether we can 
observe explicit or potential penalties for sovereign default in our case. If the 
sanctions model can explain our case, then we can observe the penalty in the default 
episode and the cancellation or reduction of penalty in the restructuring episode. The 
first step is to find the candidates for penalties. The existing literature presents a 
number of mechanisms for direct sanctions. Some of them are obviously inapplicable 
in our case. For example, cutoff of international payment service is unlikely to be an 
effective mechanism given the advanced delivery system and competition of banks in 
the 20th century. Finally, I find that trade sanctions, gunboat sanctions, and seizure of 
goods and assets to be the three possible mechanisms in our case. 
The possibility of trade sanctions is low. There are two channels for trade sanctions: 
punishment directly imposed on the defaulting country by the creditors or the 
government in behalf of the creditors and punishment imposed on the defaulting 
country through litigation in the creditor countries' courts. The issue of sovereign 
immunity in common law jurisdictions in the first half of the century makes the 
second channel unlikely. We also cannot find any evidence in documents that record 
the litigation against the Chinese government for sovereign default. The first channel 
is also unlikely to exist in our case. Unofficial trade sanctions from a small private 
creditor can hardly have any influence on a big country like China. An official 
punishment in trade is too costly for creditors to lose a large market like China. 
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Specifically, as maritime custom revenue provides debt service for several important 
loans, an official trade sanctions to enforce debt repayment may make the debt service 
even difficult. Therefore, the channel of trade sanctions is very limited in our case. 
The following trade data can also support our explanation. However, exports and 
imports do not seem to have any correlation with the sovereign default and 
restructuring episodes. 
Graph VIII Exports and Imports of China in 1921-1937 
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A gunboat sanction is more likely, especially for Japanese debts given the 
international environment in the 1930s. I cannot find enough evidence to support this 
argument. Foreign creditors frequently urge the settlement of old debts. Sometimes, 
foreign governments would also press China for action because of domestic pressure. 
However, foreign governments seldom give serious warnings to China to enforce the 
debt service. Young (1971) provides evidence on this fact through his statement, “I 
know of no pressure that could be called 'considerable’ unless it related to settlement 
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of the relatively small Japanese telephone and cable loans about the beginning of 
1935"(p-155). During the Great Depression, when many countries defaulted, foreign 
governments found invading a country that still services half of its debt unjust. Only 
one piece of evidence of military threat for debt service has been found in one 
document. The following was quoted from a correspondence between the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Railway in August 1933: "Japanese government is 
concerned about the news that Chinese government has secured a large amount of 
debt from the Western countries while leaving a lot of Japanese debt unsettled. 
Military leaders even suggest occupy China's telecom and telegraph routes to enforce 
repayment when necessary." (The Documents of Foreign Debts of the Republic of 
China, 1992, Volume 2, p. 205) Still, I cannot find any Japanese debt settled in late 
1933. The threat of gunboat sanctions from Japan had some effect on China treating 
Japanese debts with equality compared with other debts. Its effect on enforcing an in 
voluntary sovereign debt repayment was limited however. At best, it motivated the 
settlement of some small Japanese telephone and cable loans at the beginning of 1935, 
which is insignificant in the entire restructuring episode. 
The seizure of goods and assets may be the most important direct sanctions 
mechanism in our case. This finding can partly explain why the Nanking government 
served nearly half of its sovereign debt when it succeeded the Peking Regime. China 
surrendered its administration of maritime custom to foreign countries as a condition 
in the 1898 Anglo-German Sterling Loan. The collection of salt tax was also under the 
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supervision of the Salt Inspectorate, which was created by foreign countries as a 
condition in the 1913 Reorganization Loan. As the maritime customs revenue and salt 
tax were controlled by foreigners, the suspension of service of debt secured on these 
two taxes could lead to a seizure of revenue by foreign countries. This concern finally 
guaranteed the continuing repayment of debts secured on maritime customs revenue 
during the entire Peking Regime and Nanking government in the prewar decade. 
There was some delay in the service of debt secured on salt tax around 1928; however, 
the payment was quickly resumed in one year. The channel of seizure of goods and 
assets did not play any role in the enforcement of service of debts secured in other 
collaterals because the foreign creditors could not control other collaterals easily 
similar to the maritime customs revenue and salt tax. In addition, other collaterals 
could not provide a reliable income like maritime customs revenue and salt tax. 
In sum, the sanctions mechanism had some effects on enforcing the repayment of 
debts secured on maritime customs revenue and salt tax. Likewise, the mechanism 
also motivated the settlement of some small Japanese telephone and cable loans and 
ensured relatively equal treatment of Japanese creditors in the restructuring process. 
Still, it could not give a satisfactory explanation on the restructuring episode of the 
Nanking Nationalist Government. 
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Part VI Informational Explanation on the Restructuring Practice 
In Sections IV and V, I examine the reputational models (including the traditional 
reputational model and signaling model) and the sanctions model in our case. 
However, these models are unable to give a satisfactory explanation. In this section, I 
propose my explanation on the restructuring episode of China based on the 
informational model. 
A Practical Analytical Framework for the Informational Model 
The first step in formulating my explanation is to set up an analytical framework to 
examine the hypothesis of the informational model. Unfortunately, the empirical 
design of the informational model is even more difficult than that of the sanctions 
model, let alone reputational models. In the sanctions model, the sanctions are used as 
a trigger strategy; thus, the penalty should be observed immediately after a sovereign 
default. Even if the sanctions are not realized, verifying a borrower's ability to impose 
penalty on a defaulting sovereign is relatively easy. However, in the informational 
models, isolating the effect of sovereign default on the expectations of domestic and 
foreign agents from other general economic factors is almost impossible. Therefore, 
estimating the "cost" of sovereign default in the informational models is difficult 
because we almost cannot assess the economic significance of the signal emitted by 
the step into default or repayment. In contrast, the cost is quite clear in the direct 
sanctions model. Even in the reputational models, the change in access to the 
international capital market can provide enough information to estimate the cost. 
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The solution for this problem is to understand the issue of sovereign debt in the 
overall situation of an economy. In the reputational models and sanctions model, the 
cost of default is relatively certain for a specific sovereign borrower. However, in the 
informational models, the cost of default is closely related to the overall situation of 
the economy and is frequently subject to external shocks. According to the analytical 
framework of informational models, the choice of default or repayment will send a 
signal about economic fundamentals to the public, which in turn will bring a 
significant cost or benefit for the government. There are many channels through 
which the expectation of economic fundamentals may affect the welfare of the 
government. In Sandleris's paper, he models a channel using a firm's net worth and 
domestic investment. In Cole and Kehoe's general reputational model (which can be 
viewed as a special case of informational model), the channel is through the trust 
relationship. In our case, the channel could be through the confidence in the 
monetary system. 
The cost of default is frequently affected by external shocks through the channels of 
the informational model. Usually, the benefit of default is relatively certain, which is 
the outstanding amount of debts in arrears. Thus, the default or repayment choice is 
mainly determined by the variation of the cost of default in the informational model. 
A default or settlement is usually triggered by external shocks, which can significantly 
change the cost of default. This occurrence can explain why a country often defaults 
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or repays in unusual circumstances. In our case, the variation of the cost of default 
caused by the structural reform of monetary system explains why the government was 
reluctant to settle debts initially but changed its attitude dramatically in late 1935. The 
change of the time preferences determined by the variation of the cost of defaults is 
now endogenous to external shocks instead of being exogenous in the signaling 
model. 
Issue of Credibility and Currency Reform 
As discussed in Section II, the American Act of Silver Purchase put China into deep 
deflation and recession in 1934-1935. The Nanking government finally decided to 
abolish the silver standard and adopt the paper money system in November 1935. This 
structural reform has historical significance in Chinese history because it established a 
pure paper money system for the first time in China. This exogenous shock might 
significantly change the cost-benefit analysis of the sovereign debt repayment 
The lack of credibility of the government was a big obstacle in the implementation of 
the paper money system. In the political economy of the Republic of China, 
credibility was always an important issue the government could not avoid in the 
policy-making process. As such, Young wrote in his book, "From time immemorial, 
China's people distrusted government and wanted as little as possible to do with it. 
They tended to regard officials as mandarins who were in authority to serve their 
selfish interest than the public's. That traditional atmosphere was not conducive to 
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psychological support of government and especially of fiscal policies. Only when 
people have reasonable confidence in the standards and policies of government, 
conditions are ripe for bettering adequately a system of receipts and payments" (1971, 
p.151). This statement indicates that the confidence of the public in the Chinese 
government was not high for a long time. 
In the political economy of the Republic of China, the issue of credibility can be 
observed on two levels. First is the lending relationship determined by whether the 
government honors its debt obligations, and second is the credibility of the monetary 
system determined by the government's ability to stabilize the price level. Historically, 
during the political confusion in the 1910s and 1920s, the silver standard bolstered the 
credibility of the Chinese monetary system. When warlords and local governments 
issued excessive amounts of notes to finance their fiscal deficit, the public refused to 
accept these notes and used silver instead. This mechanism stabilized the Chinese 
economy and limited the ability of the government to use paper financing, further 
creating the psychological reliance of the public on silver at the same time. The 
currency reform that diminished the role of silver standard in sustaining the credibility 
of the government must be implemented with the additional confidence of the public 
in the government. Otherwise, it will only repeat the numerous failures in history. 
The lack of confidence in the monetary system was revealed even before the currency 
reform. When the silver price rose dramatically, and the government imposed an 
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export tax on silver, the fear that the government would devalue the Chinese currency 
grew rapidly. Large capital flight began when foreign companies and wealthy Chinese 
moved their capital abroad one after another, eventually causing a financial panic and 
recession from 1934 to 1935. When the currency reform was finally implemented in 
November 3, 1935, the government was extremely careful in managing the 
expectation of the public, a lesson it learned from the recession that occurred from 
1934 to 1935. To boost the confidence of the public in the reform, the Nanking 
government declared that it would maintain the convertibility of new paper money to 
foreign exchange and stabilize the exchange rate. This policy facilitated the exchange 
of paper money with silver in circulation, but it put China at risk of exhausting its 
foreign exchange. As a legacy of the imperial monetary system of silver standard, the 
Chinese public was very careful about the value of the paper notes. Once they sensed 
the slightest drop in the value of the legal note, they would sell them in the foreign 
exchange market one after another, which could cause a currency crisis. 
The Need for the Settlement of Old Debts 
The settlement of old debts might be used as a useful tool to establish public 
confidence on the new paper money system in such circumstance for two reasons. 
First, settlement of old debts can provide a signal of fiscal discipline to boost the 
confidence in the government. The fiscal status of China had fallen into chaos since 
the beginning of the 1920s. The government was frequently criticized for pledging 
taxes for fresh loans while leaving old debts secured on the same collateral unsettled. 
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The ambiguous attitude towards debt in arrears aroused doubt on the ability of the 
government to initiate a structural reform of its fiscal and monetary system. A 
settlement of old debts can signal the change of the time preferences of the 
government from myopia to a responsible regime, as illustrated in the signaling model. 
The influence of the signal is not limited to the improvement of capital market access, 
as claimed in the signaling model. Rather, it serves to boost the overall confidence of 
both domestic and foreign agents in the government and subsequently in the currency 
reform. 
This signal is especially important in attracting foreign capitals and capitals of 
wealthy Chinese which had fled abroad, to maintain exchange rate stability. 
Historically, China ran a current account deficit. Although the deficit gradually 
narrowed in the prewar decade, capital account surplus always needed to compensate 
for the deficit and provide extra foreign reserves for maintaining exchange rate 
stability. The Shanghai financial crisis made a significant amount of capital flight out 
of China, including both foreign capitals and domestic capitals from rich Chinese. 
When the currency reform was implemented, the foreign exchange reserve for China 
was merely $30 million. A favorable signal through the settlement of old debts was 
necessary for the capitals to return. Not only government projects but also private 
firms can absorb additional financial resources provided by the flow of foreign 
capitals. These investments can improve the strength of the Chinese economy and 
reduce the current account deficit in the end in turn. 
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Second, the sovereign debt problem limited the government's ability to seek foreign 
assistance, which was very important in the successful implementation of the currency 
reform. External support was crucially required in at least two aspects: First, China 
needed to acquire foreign reserves from foreign governments. Without enough foreign 
reserve support, the new paper money system would be attacked by speculators, 
leading to the eventual collapse of the system. The sale of silver at a fair price in the 
international market was essential to ensure the success of the reform. However, the 
international silver market was too small to provide enough liquidity to absorb the 
Chinese silver stock. It was only possible to find a sovereign country to buy a bunch 
of silver stock at a price higher than the domestic silver price. Otherwise, China 
would suffer significant loss during the process. Second, technical cooperation and 
moral support from the foreign government were also important. Foreigners and 
foreign banks still enjoyed extrality in some regions of China in the 1930s. Without 
the cooperation of the foreign government, the banning of silver payments and 
replacement of paper money would not have had much effect on foreigners in China. 
Moral support was also required to boost the confidence of investors on China. As 
Young commented, “British financial prestige in China remained high despite the 
pound's troubles. Without British cooperation and public indication of moral support 
either China would have let matters drift with risk of being forced to an inconvertible 
paper currency, or would have undertaken the reform with less assurance of success" 
(1971, p. 232). 
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Since the imposition of silver export duty, China negotiated actively with the U.S. and 
the U.K. in the hope of solving the currency problem with foreign cooperation. 
However, this effort was affected by the sovereign debt problem of China. Creditors 
in Western countries had continuously complained to their government about the 
untmstworthiness of China for a long time. In November 1932, V.K. Wellington Koo 
stated in a letter sent to the Executive Yuan that the failure of honoring debt 
obligations aroused a "favoring Japan" atmosphere among Western countries (The 
Historical Documents of Foreign Debts of the Republic of China, 1992, Volume 02, p. 
134). In the negotiations about foreign support of currency reform, the issue of 
Chinese sovereign debt is also an important topic. U.K. Representative Leith-Ross 
explicitly expressed that the settlement of the Tiestin-Pukow and Hukuang loans was 
a precondition for further help in the currency reform, such as currency credit from 
the U.K. U.S. also urged the settlement of the Chicago Bank Loan when China 
asked for further support for the currency reform in December 1935. These evidences 
shows that the sovereign default of China might have significant negative influence 
on obtaining foreign support for the currency reform. 
The relationship between currency reform and debt settlements is twofold. On one 
hand, the continuing success of the currency reform is closely related to the settlement 
of old debts. On the other hand, the currency reform could provide a favorable 
environment for the settlement of old debts. The initial success of the currency reform 
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gave the leaders the confidence to rescue China from the deep recession caused by the 
American Silver Purchase Act. The settlement of old debts in arrears then became 
possible. Otherwise, the assumption of large-amount debts in the process of deep 
recession might bring in a disastrous result for a country with only $30 million of 
foreign reserves. Without the success of the currency reform, which stopped the 
financial crisis and capital flight from 1934 to 1935, the capability of the Chinese 
government in solving complicated fiscal problems would have been limited. 
In Sandleris's informational model, a country defaults in the equilibrium state if the 
economy fundamentals are hit by a strong negative shock. The cost of sovereign 
default depends on the fundamentals of an economy. That is, when the outlook for the 
economy is bad, the gains from maintaining credibility and emitting a positive signal 
are small; thus, the government defaults. This negative signal affects the expectation 
of domestic and foreign agents and finally causes a vicious cycle of financial crisis. 
Such occurrence is common in reality, as we often see a sovereign default followed by 
a currency crisis and severe exchange rate devaluation, eventually causing a full-scale 
financial crisis. Our case can be considered a mirror of Sandleris's scenario. The 
structural reform of the monetary system promoted the confidence of the government 
in dealing with a complicated fiscal problem and encouraged to the government to 
convey this information to the public. Thus, the settlement of debt in arrears was 
resumed to emit a positive signal to boost the confidence of the public. In turn, the 
settlement created a favorable environment for the continuing success of the currency 
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reform. Thus, a virtuous cycle was created, helping China step out from the deep 
recession and establish a healthier fiscal status. 
Outcomes 
The settlement turned out to be successful. Foreign capitalists were impressed by the 
success of the reform, and the prices of Chinese sovereign bonds rose significantly in 
the London Stock Exchange. Flighted capital returned and foreign capital showed 
signs of coming for investment. Foreign governments were also satisfied with the 
settlement, and they offered assistance in the reform of the currency system. The U.K. 
issued a King's regulation that cited the decree of the currency reform and forbid 
British nationals to pay in silver for any obligations in China. The U.S. government 
bought $86 million silver at a price profitable for China and agreed to extend the 
maturity of the Food Relief Loan and American Cotton and Wheat Loan. The 
assistance of these countries guaranteed the success of the currency reform. 
The confidence of the public in the paper money system was established, and silver 
was successfully abandoned as a method of payment. The following two graphs show 
the price index in Shanghai and the exchange rate of the Chinese currency for the 
entire decade, respectively. 
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Graph IX Wholesale Price Index in Shanghai 
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Mecliuni Exchange Rate to U.S. Dollar 
Monetary expansion produced moderate inflation, which brought the price level close 
74 
to that in 1931. The exchange rate was fixed at around 1 Chinese dollar to 0.3 U.S. 
Dollar after the reform. This parity held even a half year after the war broke out. 
Holding of foreign reserves (including gold and silver) reached $379 million on June 
30, 1937. The composition of foreign reserve also improved, and the percentage of 
silver in the reserve declined to less than 50%. Before the currency reform, the 
amount of foreign currency reserve plus gold was only $30 million. The silver stock 
in December 1935 was $276 million. Including the initial sale of silver $32.5 million 
in November 1935, the original foreign reserve of China was $338.5 million before 
the currency reform. This fact indicates a capital inflow of $40.5 million in the 20 
months after the currency reform, showing the successful establishment of the 
confidence in the paper money system. 
After the currency reform and the settlement of old debts, China stepped into a new 
era of fast economic development. Investment increased dramatically, as reflected in 
the increase in net domestic capital formation. Industrial products also recorded the 
highest growth in the prewar decade in 1936. 
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Graph XI Net Domestic Capital Formation in China, 1931-1936 
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Foreign media also praised China for its successful currency and fiscal reform. 
According to U.S. Ambassador Johnson, "an era of economic development under 
National Government leadership has begun" (1971, p.419). He also questioned 
whether the United States "should not participate more actively" (1971, p.419). In 
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1937, right after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, The London Economist commented, 
"All observers seem to be agreed that China has been pulling round with remarkable 
success during the last year or two...The financial and economic condition of the 
country has been distinctly improving...Have the Japanese army now made up their 
minds to swallow China whole before she is completely herself again?" (1971, p.419). 
The progress of China in the past 20 months was widely recognized by the foreign 
public, contributing greatly to the sustainability of the Chinese government in the 
tough eight-year war against Japan. 
Summary 
In this section, I explain the restructuring episode of the Nanking government based 
on the informational model. The trigger of the large-scale settlement of old debts was 
the exogenous shock of currency reform, that is, the Silver Purchase Act of America. 
To boost the confidence of capitalists and gain support from foreign governments, the 
Nanking government settled the old debts as a signal of positive outlook on the 
currency reform. The signal partly contributed to the recovery of confidence in the 
economic situation and the establishment of the credibility of the paper money system. 
Through the settlement of old debts, the Nanking government gained not only 
improved access to the capital market but also higher confidence in the structural 
reform of the monetary system, eventually helping it recover from the silver 
recession. 
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My analysis also bears some resemblance with that of Cole, Dow, and English's (1995) 
signaling model, in which a defaulting sovereign conducts a partial settlement to 
signal its time preference has changed to be more responsible. Nevertheless, I make 
some adjustments on the signaling model by explaining the underlying mechanism of 
the change in time preferences, which is assumed to be exogenous in the signaling 
model. Moreover, my analysis focuses more on the effect of the settlement on the 
overall situation of the Chinese economy, whereas the signaling model is mainly 
concentrated on the capital market access. 
My analysis provides a new self-enforcing mechanism for sovereign debt repayment. 
This mechanism is not limited to my special case actually. Historically, economies 
facing structural reforms often renegotiate their defaulted debts borrowed many years 
ago. The former USSR renegotiated its pre-revolutionary debt with France and U.K. 
in the 1980s. The People's Republic of China (PRC) also reached an agreement with 
the United States in 1979 about a partial settlement of its old debts. Although foreign 
creditors could only recover part of its claim in the settlement, these settlements 
provide an important signal of the resolution of the government to conduct a structural 
reform. The meaning of the signal is often not limited to regaining access to capital 
market. In the case of the USSR and PRC, both countries were able to borrow before 
the settlement. Thus, the signal served to reveal the resolution and ability of the 
government to prioritize the implementation of the structural reform. 
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Conclusion 
In the current paper, I examine the debt restructuring practice of the Chinese Nanking 
Nationalist Government in the prewar era and its subsequent effects. Based on the 
analytical framework of the informational model, I provide my innovative explanation 
that the Nanking government created a virtuous cycle in its attempt to deal with the 
exogenous shock of severe domestic deflation by linking currency reform and the 
settlement of old debts together. The American Act of Silver Purchase lifted the 
international silver price and induced severe deflation and recession in China. The 
recession finally drove China off the silver standard and pushed it adopt the paper 
money system in November 1935. The initial success created a favorable environment 
for the settlement of old debts. To boost the confidence of the public in the fiscal 
discipline of the government after adopting the paper money system and to gain 
foreign support for the reform, the Nanking government settled large debts owed to 
foreign creditors. The settlement promoted the continuing success of the reform and 
stimulated the growth of the Chinese economy in the following two years, which was 
a great success given the international environment of the Great Depression in the 
1930s. 
I also examine the case using the traditional reputational model, signaling model, and 
sanctions model. I find evidence of reputational punishment, as predicted by the 
traditional reputational model. However, the inherent instability of the punishment 
limits the ability to enforce the settlement. The role of sanctions is also limited in my 
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case. Traditional trade sanctions were not possible given the historical background. 
The threat of gunboat sanction did exist; however, it merely motivated the settlement 
of some small loans. Seizure of collateral guaranteed the repayment of secured debt, 
but it had little to do with the restructuring episode. The signaling model is useful in 
explaining the improved capital market access of China. Its weakness is the isolation 
of debt relationship from the overall economic situation, which hinders us to explore 
the deeper reason for sovereign default and repayment. 
Viewed from a broader context of sovereign borrowings, my analysis suggests that the 
lending relationship is often an integral part of the economic policy of a government. 
The decision of a sovereign borrower on debt service could be closely related to its 
management of public expectations in some circumstances. Although the information 
cost on the confidence of the public is usually implicit and difficult to measure, it may 
be large enough to motivate a default or settlement in some cases. 
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Appendix I Basic information on Chinese sovereign bonds traded in the London 
Stock Exchange 
Table A Background information on Chinese foreign bonds traded in London 
Interest Issuing Actual Issuing Notional 
Name Collateral 
Rate Price Proceeds Date Principal(Million) 
Anglo-German Sterling 
4.5 90 83 1898.3.1 16 Maritime Custom Revenue 
Loan 
Anglo-French Loan 5 98 94 1908.10.8 5 Surplus Revenue of Salt Tax 
5%Crisp Gold Loan 5 95 89 1912.8.30 5 Surplus Revenue of Salt Tax 
Reorganization Loan 5 90 84 1913.4.26 25 Surplus Revenue of Salt Tax 
Boxer Indemnity (Backed by 
Sino-French Gold Bonds 5 100 100 1924.12.1 75.32 
Maritime Custom Tax) 
Profits of & mortgage on the 
Shanghai-Nanking 5 97.5 90 1903.12.1 2.9 
railroad 
Tientsin-Pukow Likin & internal revenues of 
5 101 95 1910.11.1 3 
Supplementary Hebei, Shandong & Jiangsu 
Likin & internal revenues of 
Tientsin-Pukow 5 98.75 93 1908.10.1 5 
Hebei, Shandong & Jiangsu 
Surplus Revenue of 
Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo 5 99 93 1908.6.1 1.5 ... . ^ 
Beijmg-Fengtian Railway 
Profits of & mortgage on the 
Daoqing 5 96 90 1905.7.1 0.8 
railroad 
Railway Income, Hubei & 
Hukuang 5 101 95 1911.6.3 6 Hunan salt & likin revenues, 
& Hubei rice tax 
Government guarantee & 
Lunghai 5 91 85 1912.9.24 4 
mortgage on railway 
Profits of & mortgage on the 
Canton-Kowloon 5 100 94 1907.12.1 1.5 
railroad 
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Table B Pricing details of Chinese foreign bonds traded in the London Stock 
Exchange 
Data Data . 
Defaulting Restructuring Issuing Actual Observation 
Name Available Available 
Date Date Yield Cost s 
from to 
Anglo-German 
N/A \ 5.07% 5.53% 1933.1.13 1937.6.25 189 
Sterling Loan 
Anglo-French Loan N/A \ 5.13% 5.41% 1933.1.13 1937.6.25 189 
5%Crisp Gold Loan N/A \ 5.30% 5.70% 1933.1.13 1937.6.25 189 
Reorganization Loan N/A \ 5.61% 6.03% 1933.1.13 1937.6.25 189 
Sino-French Gold 
N/A \ 5.00% 5.00% 1933.1.13 1937.6.25 189 
Bonds 
Shanghai-Nanking N/A 5.14% 5.60% 1933.1.13 1937.6.25 189 
Tientsin-Pukow 
1924.11.1 1936.2.26 4.94% 5.34% 1933.1.13 1937.6.25 187 
Supplementary 
Tientsin-Pukow 1924.10.1 1936.2.26 5.08% 5.48% 1933.1.13 1937.6.25 187 
Shanghai-Hangchow-
N/A \ 5.07% 5.48% 1933.1.13 1935.5.31 91 
Ningpo 
Daoqing 1926.1.1 1936.5.5 5.27% 5.70% 1933.1.13 1937.6.25 173 
Hukuang 1925.6.3 1937.4.5 4.94% 5.30% 1933.1.13 1937.6.25 188 
Lunghai 1925.9.24 1936.8.25 5.56% 5.99% 1933.1.13 1937.6.25 188 
Canton-Kowloon 1925.12.1 1936.8.26 5.00% 5.41% 1936.9.18 1937.6.25 37 
The issuing yield represents the yield to maturity at the issuing price, which the 
investors pay the investment banks. The actual cost is the real cost of capital from the 
bond issuing activities of the Chinese government. There is a commission fee; thus, 
the issuing yield is always lower than the actual cost. 
Table C General information on the 6% Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo" Railway 
Completion Loan 
Issuing Actual Issuing Scheduled Issuing Actual Notional 
Interest Rate ^ , _ Matunty(Year) _ , _ , , 广 ^ . . 
Price Proceeds Date End Date Yield Cost Principal(Million) 
6% 94 88 1936-6-15 25 1961-6-15 6.49% 7.02% J J ^ 
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Appendix II Price of Chinese Sovereign Bonds traded in the London Stock 
Exchange 







1933-1-13 1933-7-7 1934，l-121934-7-201935-l-25 1935-8-2 1936-2-7 1936-7-311937-2-5 
Graph B Anglo-French Loan 
105 . 98.5 98 • ^ 
= 一 广 厂 
= i r — — — — 
60 •ninTniminiTrrn-mnrn-iTTTnTiTn-TrfrmTTrmiTrnmiTTfT^  
1933-1-13 1933-7-7 1934-1-121934-7-201935-1-25 1935-8-2 1936-2-7 1936-7-311937-2-5 
86 
Graph C. 5% Crisp Bond 
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Graph E. Sino-French Gold Bonds 
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Graph G. Tientsin-Pukow Railroad Supplementary 
肌 — m s 
"70 “ — — — 
严 
G 0 "‘ — —~”—— — —— — — —~—-赛——— 
46 f 似 J 
50 
40 " - p W 
20 —  . Z T k J ^ — 
10 
0 "WFTTnTrnrTRrmTTrTnTnTTrTTinnTnTTmmTTnTmTnTTTTmTnTTTnTmTTnTTnTTTnTTnTTTTmnTnTnTnTTTmTTnTTfTTTTrniTTnrnrTnTTnTTrTTnTTTTrmnTnrnmriTTTTTrmTnT 
1933-1-13 1933-7-7 1934-1-121934-7-201935-1-25 1935-8-2 1936-2-7 1936-7-31 1937-2-5 
Graph H. Tietsin-Pukow Railroad 
80 
70 一 
60 ^ 4 9 ^ 9 3 ” 5 0 J ^ 
：-
1Q — 
1933-1-13 1933-7-7 1934-1-121934-7-201935-1-25 1935-8-2 1936-2-7 1936-7-31 1937-2-5 
89 
Graph I. Shanghai-HangChow-Ningpo Railroad (Fully repaid around May 31, 1935) 
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Graph J. Daoqing Railroad 
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Graph K Hukuang Railroad 
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Graph M Kowloon-Canton Railroad (Data from December 4, 1936) 
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Note: "*" represents the four settlement dates of the six bonds in arrears (February 28, 
1936 for Tiestin-Pukow and Tiestin-Pukow Supplementary, May 8, 1936 for Daoqing, 
August 28, 1936 for Canton-Kowloon and Lunghai, and April 9, 1937 for Hukuang). 
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Appendix III Price level change around the settlement of the two Tiestin-Pukow 
loans 
Price (-1,1) (-2,2) (-3,3) 
Anglo-German Sterling 
Loan 103.63 0.00% 0.00% 0.48% 
Anglo-French Loan 98.25 -0.51% 0.51% 2.54% 
5%Crisp Gold Loan 79.25 0.63% 5.99% 3.47% 
Reorganization Loan 92.00 -1.09% 3.26% 1.63% 
Sino-French Gold Bonds 95.25 -0.52% 0.79% 0.00% 
Shanghai-Nanking 70.00 2.14% 7.86% 4.29% 
Tientsin-Pukow Second 39.25 12.74% 34.39% 35.67% 
Tientsin-Pukow 41.50 9.64% 36.14% 33.73% 
Daoqing 38.00 38.16% N/A N/A 
Hukuang 45.25 -5.52% 6.63% 4.42% 
Lunghai 21.50 17.44% 60.47% 53.49% 
Note: Data on the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo and Canton-Kowloon railway bonds 
are not available. The price is the average price of bond before the settlement and 
after the settlement. We use "1" to denote first Friday after the settlement (February 
28, 1936 in our case), “-1” to denote the last Friday (February 21, 1936 in our case) 
before the settlement, and (-1,1) to denote the percentage price level differences 
between these two dates. 
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Appendix IV Price levels and yield to maturities of the Chinese sovereign bonds 
on November 1，1935 and June 25,1937 
Price at Price at Percentage YTM at YTM at 
11/1/1935 6/25/1937 Change 11/1/1935 6/25/1937 ange 
Anglo-German Sterling Loan 101.75 102.50 0.74% 4.22% 4.00% 0.22% 
Anglo-French Loan 99.50 100.00 0.50% 5.18% 4.99% 0.19% 
5%Crisp Gold Loan 76.00 94.00 23.68% 7.54% 5.59% 1.95% 
Reorganization Loan 92.00 101.50 10.33% 5.60% 4.89% 0.71% 
Sino-French Gold Bonds 97.25 104.25 7.20% 5.31% 4.49% 0.82% 
Shanghai-Nanking 69.50 89.50 28.78% 8.28% 6.01% 2.27% 
Tientsin-Pukow Second 22.00 73.50 234.09% 46.17% 6.99% 39.18% 
Tientsin-Pukow 24.00 74.00 208.33% 68.24% 6.95% 61.29% 
Daoqing 27.50 87.00 216.36% Exceeded 6.14% N/A 
Hukuang 39.50 73.75 86.71% 15.27% 6.97% 8.30% 
Lunghai 12.00 44.50 270.83% 42.02% 11.33% 30.69% 
Note: Data on the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo and Canton-Kowloon railway bonds 
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